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Chapter 8
Short-RunResponse to Phase III
Perhapsthe most important statement that can be made about the short-run
period following devaluation is that, almost inevitably, it will be difficult if
Phase III is anything more than a tidying-up operation. Reducing the rate of
growth of the money supply (and raising interest rates) will lead to some
dislocations for those denied access to credit. Regardless of whether govern-
ment spending is held in check or taxes are increased to reduce the government
deficit, there will be politically important groups adversely affected by the pro-
posed change. Even the changes in the import regime will lead to outcries; if
imports are liberalized, the groups formerly receiving the premiums on import
licenses will be disadvantaged, as will domestic import-competing firms which
spring up—economic or not—in theinsulateddomestic marketthat
characterizes the later stages of Phase II; if imports are curtailed sharply, im-
porters and consumers will be disaffected.
To a considerable extent, some adverse reactions are unavoidable,
although there have been cases where inappropriate or unnecessarily severe
measures resulted in greater disruption than was necessary. Any policies
designed to result in resource reallocation are bound to result in some short-
run dislocations. The adverse political reactions are bound to be greater, the
more delayed the potential benefits resulting from the new regime, but the at-
tempt to shift a QR regime to a liberalized regime, with an attendant change in
bias and exportable production, will always entail short-term costs that must
be incurred before the longer-term benefits can be realized.
In addition to inevitable dislocations resulting from the policy shift,
however, there are two widely held beliefs about the initial effects of devalua-
tion: (1) that it is inflationary; and (2) that it results in domestic recession.'
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PRICE LEVEL BEHAVIOR 145
Even here there are two separate issues: (a) the extent to which each of these
two beliefs is based upon empirical evidence; and (b) the extent to which such
an outcome is inevitable under optimal policy. In this chapter the empirical
evidence is under consideration. After all, it is not only a question of whether
devaluation is inflationary, but whether the inflationary impact is sizable or
not. Likewise, even if devaluation has an adverse impact on the level of
economic activity, its magnitude is important. Optimality considerations are
covered in Chapter 10.
The first section reviews the evidence from the country studies with regard
to the impact of devaluation on the price level. The second section then ex-
amines the record with regard to the level of economic activity. A final section
traces the balance-of-payments experience of the countries in the short-run
period following devaluation.
I. PRICE LEVEL BEHAVIOR
Perhaps the most pervasive belief is that devaluation is inflationary. At an
analytical level, several observations are in order: (1) it is far simpler to defend
the view that devaluation will result in a once-and-for-all increase in the price
level than it is to provide a priori reasons why devaluation should affect the
rate of inflation; (2) devaluation from exchange control is less likely to raise
the price level than is a devaluation intended to reduce an open deficit; (3) im-
port liberalization and the absorption of purchasing power through the
transfer of premiums are likely to be deflationary, and thus they may offset
part or all of the increase in the price level that would otherwise result; and
(4) price level changes depend on devaluation and all other determinants of de-
mand. An observation about the rate of change in the price level does not, by
itself, constitute sufficient evidence from which to infer the contribution of
devaluation.
Each of these four points warrants some elaboration. With respect to the
first, one can easily construct models wherein domestic prices of tradables
equal their international prices times the price of foreign exchange, while
domestic prices of nontradables are rigid downward. In those models an in-
crease in the price of foreign exchange automatically represents an increase in
the domestic price of tradables. Since the price of nontradables cannot—by
hypothesis—fall, the price level will increase with the exchange rate regardless
of the weighting scheme employed to construct the index of the price level.2
That model, however, predicts only a once-and-for-all increase in the
price level. To be sure, this increase might be stretched out over several years,
empirically, as producers adjust to the altered price of inputs and users of their
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than average "rate of inflation" in the year of devaluation, but this ter-
minology is inappropriate. If the underlying monetary and fiscal determinants
of the rate of inflation were unchanged over a long time period, a slightly
higher rate of inflation would be observed in the period following devaluation,
but the rate of inflation would be altered only in the statistical sense that the
average rate in the postdevaluation period would be higher.
Even the once-and-for-all price increaseisdifficult to attribute to
devaluation in any ultimate sense. Accepting for the moment the price-
determination model sketched out above, the determinants of the balance of
payments would have to be specified. Usually such determinants include the
behavior of the money supply and related variables. Then, one reason for
needing to devalue the currency would be because of past monetary behavior
that had not been fully reflected in the domestic price level index at a fixed ex-
change rate because of the constancy of the price of traded goods. In this case
devaluation would reflect the past domestic inflation that would have resulted
if—for example—the exchange rate had been permitted to float throughout
the period.
Those considerations, however, lead away from the point at issue here.
What is important is to distinguish between the amount of increase in the price
level following devaluation and sustained changes in the rate of increase in the
price level. The latter sort of effect from devaluation is possible only to the ex-
tent that some type of cost-push mechanism is present within the economy that
transmutes once-and-for-all price increases into an increased rate of inflation.
Debate over the likelihood and empirical relevance of such mechanisms has
continued for years, and the evidence from the country studies will hardly
resolve it. What can be said based on these studies is that the net results of
devaluation, import liberalization, and fiscal and monetary policy were such
that, on balance, the percentage price increase in the several years following
devaluation was no higher than before. In that sense they lend no support to
the hypothesis that cost-push mechanisms exist.
The second point—that devaluation is likely to result in less inflationary
pressure under exchange control than with an open deficit—follows im-
mediately from the fact that a net improvement in the trade balance is not the
sole objective of devaluation. In the traditional, open-deficit case, devaluation
will be successful only if the trade (payments) balance improves, but such an
improvement, by definition, removes supplies from the domestic economy. In
a "pure" liberalizing devaluation undertaken from balanced trade, this effect
would be entirely absent. Moreover, in devaluation with an open deficit,
assuming the absence of peculiar world supply. or demand conditions, the
domestic price of both exportables and importables must rise. With devalua-
tion from exchange control, however, that is not necessarily the case. In the
usual situation the domestic price of exportables must increase, but it is not
always true that the domestic price of importables will also rise; insofar as
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devaluation absorbs part of the premium on import licenses, the effect will be
to leave the domestic price unaltered, thereby reducing the bias of the regime.3
The third point is the most obvious, but it is important and has often been
overlooked. In addition to the fact that premium absorption is itself defla-
tionary, an increased flow of imports during the period following devaluation
is deflationary, and, in fact, imports have sometimes increased markedly as
part of the Phase III policy package.
This point leads immediately to the fourth consideration: the behavior of
the price level is the combined result of devaluation, of monetary and fiscal
policy, of the extent to which imports are liberalized, of random shocks such
as weather and terms-of-trade changes, and even of the behavior of real in-
come. If enough deadweight losses associated with QRs and the Phase II
regime were eliminated, or if the increased inflow of imports of intermediate
goods and spare parts permitted increased utilization of capacity, the conse-
quent increase in real output would absorb some purchasing power and could
thus offset some of the price increase that might otherwise occur. Analysis of
the behavior of the price level following Phase III must take into account all of
the impacts on domestic prices.
Table 8-1 gives the rates of price increase surrounding devaluations. The
single- and two-quarter data must be interpreted with care because seasonal
factors are important; however, the data provide a useful reference as the ex-
perience of each individual country is discussed. In addition to the examina-
tion of each country's price level behavior after key Phase III episodes, an at-
tempt was made to pool cross-section and time-series data in order to deter-
mine the general impact of devaluation on the price level; the results of this ex-
periment are also discussed in this section.
Price Level Effects in Individual Countries
BRAZIL
The 1957 Phase III appears to have had little if any monetary and fiscal
component; the major ingredients were the shift to ad valorem tariffs and the
change in the exchange rate. There was neither intent to control domestic infla-
tion nor was the inflation rate significantly affected. In contrast, the 1961
devaluationhad a significant monetary and fiscal component, which Fishlow
refers to as the "first time" orthodox policies had been attempted; however, it
was a fairly short-lived attempt. The effects of the 1961 devaluation on the
price level are reported by Fishlow and cited in Chapter 7. Relative prices did
adjust without a cutback in real output. However, a political crisis brought in
a new government, which promptly abandoned monetary and fiscal restraint.148 SHORT-RUNRESPONSE TO PHASE III
Table 8-1.Rates of Inflation over Specified Periods before and after























































































































Egypt 1962 II —2.0 1.0 —2.0 1.0 —2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0
Ghana 1967 III 8.1 4.5 6.4 9.0 2.0 20.3 3.1 22.5









































































Sources: All data are from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Line 63 was the source
except for Brazil, Chile, and the Philippines, for which line 63a was used, and Israel, for which
line 64 was used. Data for Colombia for 1951 are from line 83, and for 1957, from line 62.
Whereas the 1961 devaluation was accompanied by a short-lived pro-
gram, Brazil's 1964 Phase III episode was of an entirely different character,
lasting from November 1964 until the end of 1967. Fishlow characterizes the
1964-1967 Phase III as being differentiated from that of 1961, not by the in-
struments used, but by the fact that they were applied over an extended
period.4 Their application was not uniform over this time, however. Monetary
restraint was eased during the recession of 1965 as the money supply increased
75 percent during the year, and then in 1966 "the monetary brake was applied
harshly and expansion limited to 16 percent provoking another and more
serious slowdown in industrial activity..
.
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behind the increases in the price level, so that real minimum wages fell about
20 percent over the 1964-1967 period, according to Fishlow's calculations.6 It
was anticipated that this would affect producer expectations with regard to
future prices and that inflation would be slowed. Such was dramatically the
case: compared with inflation rates of 40 to 90 percent in 1962-1964, inflation
slowed to an annual average of 15 percent prior to
Fishlow does not explicitly comment on the initial effect of the 1964
devaluation on the Brazilian price level. What seems clear is that Brazilian in-
flation was' sufficiently rampant so that sustained efforts were required to con-
tain it. The upward impact of devaluation on the price level cannot be isolated,
but it was certainly not positive enough to prevent "orthodox" policies from
working.
CHILE
By far the most ambitious effort to estimate econometrically the effect of
devaluation and liberalization on the price level was made by Behrman, who
estimated the determinants of the rateof increase ofChilean prices in both a
partial and a general equilibrium framework. Behrman notes that simple com-
parison of inflation rates before and after the Chilean Phase III episodes
reveals a lower mean rate following the devaluations, but he attributes that fin-
ding to the fact that stabilization programs, with their restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies, accompanied the devaluations.
Behrman's partial equilibrium estimate of the determinants of inflation
indicated that domestic variables had most of the explanatory power.' When
allowance is made for the fact that the money supply is partly determined en-
dogenously via the balance of payments and other general equilibrium rela-
tions, the impact of the foreign sector is considerably greater. Behrman con-
cluded:
The widespread reluctance of Chileans to devalue because of an anticipated
negative short-run inflationary impact, then, is well-founded. Such price increases,
moreover, undo much of the potential positive effects of devaluation on the
balance of payments. ...Unlessmuch more powerful monetary tools are
developed, however, Chile cannot avoid the intensification of inflationary
pressures from devaluation. .
..°
However,when he simulated a devaluation in which quantitative restrictions
were also relaxed so that reserves did not increase, the results were different:
If liberalization accompanies devaluation, the price effects of the former will
at best partially offset the inflationary consequences of the latter. This counterac-
ting tendency has been too often ignored in discussions of the short-run conse-
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increases lagged150 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
This finding underlines the consideration noted above: if the flow of imports
increases as part of the Phase III policy package, that deflationary impact can
offset the once-and-for-all upward pressure on prices that results from
devaluation.
The allegation that devaluation has an inflationary impact became very
important in Colombia following the 1962 Phase III episode. Prices rose at an
average annual rate of 10 to 12 percent compared to a rate of 2 percent in the
year prior to devaluation." Diaz estimated the determinants of this inflation
rate, and he used these estimates both to examine the impact of exchange rate
changes and changes in the flow of imports and to compared the predictions
resulting from his estimated inflation rates against the actual rates. He found
that his results were much more satisfactory with quarterly than with annual
data, and he regressed percentage changes in various price indexes as functions
of lagged money supply, wages, the exchange rate, and real supplies:
The regressions also show that changes in the import exchange rate do significant-
ly influence changes in the price level. That influence is also quick (yearly changes
for the exchange rate performed much worse than quarterly ones) and quan-
titatively important. A 10 percent devaluation would be expected to increase
prices by about 2 percent, ceteris paribus, according to these equations. It is
noteworthy that when the 1956-58 period is included in the regressions, the im-
portance of the exchange rate variable declines. For reasons that are not com-
pletely clear, the very large devaluations of those years affected the price level less
than devaluations of later years. At any rate, even the 1958-69 results show that
the extreme claims often heard in Colombia, which imply a value of 1.0 for the
sum of the exchange-rate coefficients, are exaggerated. The combination of short
lags for the price effects of devaluations, somewhat longer ones for wage-rate
changes, and much longer (and less clear) ones for money, in turn influenced by
fiscal and monetary policies, suggests an explanation for the popular but exag-
gerated identification of devaluations with inflation.'2
Using his regression results, simulated the behavior of the price level
on the assumption of a 10 percent devaluation and a 10 percent permanent in-
crease in the flow of imports. He found that after all the lagged effects had
been worked out, his equations predicted a price increase of about 1 percent
nine quarters later. Prices would have increased in the period immediately
following devaluation (as the exchange rate response came quickly) and then
would have decreased in response to increased supplies of imports.'3
In examining the behavior of prices in the period following the 1962
devaluation—the period when the inflationary burst offset the increase in the
exchange rate—D(az found that his regression equations accounted for "most,
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but not all," of the inflation. He notes that the government raised a large
number of prices of commodities that had been subject to price controls, in-
cluding not only electricity and public transportation but also some "basic
necessities."
In contrast with the inflation following the 1962 devaluation, Diaz found
that the inflation of 1966 was quite "normal." Imports had been liberalized so
that real supplies increased. Diaz's results indicated that the price level effect
of devaluation should have been positive in the first two quarters following
devaluation (by 4 and 3 percent respectively), but that the lagged effect of the
real supplies variable should have resulted in small deflationary pressures (less
than 1 percent) in each of the next three quarters.
These findings accord well with the notion that the price level impact of
devaluation is a once-and-for-all phenomenon that can be offset by increased
supplies of imports. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Diaz's empirical
results is the suggestion that there may be a sort of inverse J-curve response of
the price level when devaluation is accompanied by increased import flows:
prices may initially increase in (quick) response to the devaluation, and fall
thereafter as the influence of increased supplies is felt.
EGYPT
Egypt's 23 percent gross devaluation represented only a 3 percent net
devaluation. Moreover, other policies—including nationalizations—were be-
ing pursued during the period surrounding Phase III, and monetary and fiscal
policy were expansionary afterward. Under these circumstances the deter-
minants of the behavior of the price level were quite independent of the ex-
change rate change.
GHANA
The consumer price index of Ghana was "slightly lower" in the five months
following devaluation than in the six months preceding it, and Leith found
that relative prices changed. The domestic price of exportables rose relative to
the domestic price of importables and home goods; and the domestic price of
importables fell relative to. exportables but rose relative to home goods.4 The
Ghanaian government had been engaged in restrictive fiscal policy for a year
prior to the devaluation. Leith concluded that
the combined effect of the devaluation package and the government's fiscal
policy does not appear to have been inflationary. On the contrary, the initial
ditions surrounding the devaluation suggest that the growth of excess demand for
real resources by domestic residents was dampened, and possibly even the ab-
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INDIA
Bhagwati and Srinivasan explained:
There was price inflation in India, at any rate since 1962-63, and the pace of price
rise indeed quickened in 1966-67. This led some uncritical observers to attribute
this phenomenon to devaluation on a posthoc ergo propterhoc basis.
Inthe Indian context, they demonstrate that the price of food grains is domi-
nant in determining the overall price level. They estimated a simultaneous
equations model of price determination for food grains and then contrasted
the actual behavior of food grains prices with that predicted by their model at
three output levels: (1) with actual food grain output; (2) with 1964/65 levels
of output; and (3) with trend levels of output. Actual food grain prices rose
from 139 to 175 during the two years following the 1964/65 harvest, and the
price increase was somewhat less than that predicted by their model with actual
values of output. Had agricultural output held constant, their results would
have predicted a much smaller increase in prices; had agricultural output in-
creased at its trend rate, the observed price increase would have been less than
9 percent over the two years. '7
ISRAEL
Israel's two Phase III experiences began from entirely different bases. In
1952 the economy had been governed by quantitative controls of all kinds, and
there was repressed domestic inflation—controlled prices were used in official
price indexes, while black markets abounded. During the 1952-1955 period,
there was a virtually complete shift from QRs to reliance on prices. The of-
ficial price statistics, therefore, are not reliable and overstate the true rate of
inflation during that interval. Michaely made no effort, in view of the poor
quality of the statistics, to estimate the determinants of the price level, but con-
cluded:
During 1952-54, the domestic price increase, although substantial, was far below
the increase in the rate of exchange. ... Thislag of movement of local prices
behind the exchange rate is all the more remarkable in view of the preceding com-
ment on the strong upward bias involved in the use of official price indexes....
Incontrast, domestic prices rose rapidly following the 1962 devaluation, and
the change in the real exchange rate was almost completely eroded within three
years. Michaely attributed this phenomenon to the expansionary demand
policy that accompanied devaluation, rather than to the devaluation itself.
Overall, the 1952-1955 Israeli experience must be judged to be one of the
cases in which devaluation was part of a policy package that ultimately
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however, is one in which the inflation rate was apparently essentially unaf-
fected.
SOUTH KOREA
The South Korean experience is somewhat like that of Israel, except the
order is reversed. The first liberalization effort in 1961 failed as a consequence
of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy and a bad crop following devalua-
tion. The second attempt in 1964 was followed by a marked and sustained
reduction in the rate of inflation; during the two years after the 1964 devalua-
tion, prices increased by less than 8 percent annually compared with rates of
more than 25 percent in each of the two years preceding devaluation (see Table
8-1).
Frank, Kim, and Westphal summarized the reasons for success in con-
trolling inflation:
•.. TheMay 1964 devaluation of about 50 percent (from 130 won to 257 won to
the dollar) was not inflationary largely because of the monetary and fiscal
stabilization program. Another fact is important here also: the devaluation was
more de jure than de facto, at least with respect to exports. ...Sincethe
devaluation was not really de facto, there was little upward pressure on the prices
of export goods.
The sharp rise in the bank deposit rate in 1965 also helped to curb infla-
tionary pressures. The great rise in savings and bank deposits substantially reduc=
ed the velocity of circulation of the money supply.
Theincrease in deposits resulted from monetary and interest rate reforms that
had followed the 1964 devaluation.
THE PHILIPPINES
The 1960-1962 Philippine Phase 111 episode was designed to liberalize the
regime. Macroeconomic considerations had not been important in leading to
the decision to shift away from quantitative restrictions, and, as the data in
Table 8-1 show, inflation was not a problem either before, during, or after the
transition period. Indeed, Baldwin reports the deliberate use of easy monetary
policy during 1961, presumably to facilitate the
In contrast the 1970 devaluation had its roots in the foreign exchange
crisis that resulted from a large government budget deficit the preceding year.
A policy of monetary restraint was followed in the postdevaluation period, but
it is difficult to sort out the effects of the prior increases in the money supply
from the impact of devaluation itself; in any event, the rate of inflation did not
abate significantly.154 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
TURKEY following the St
Turkey's two experiences are distinctly different. The .1958 devaluation money-supply/1
was followed by a once-and-for-all increase in the prices of a large number of. all signs were i
commoditieswhose prices had been subject to controls. Thereafter the earlier fidence level. TI
inflation—at least 20 to 25 percent per year according to the official statistics
. balanceafter ta,
(based on controlled, not black market, prices)—abated, and the price level
. influenceswas t
was constant over the next several years. The major factors accounting for the Such a resu
control of inflation were the adoption of realistic pricing policies by the State control is deflai
Economic Enterprises and the increased flow of imports that followed dividual studies
devaluation. The State Economic Enterprises had been incurring large deficits, tionary pressure
which were financed by central bank credits in the 1955-1958 period; those the effect of dev
credits had resulted in large increases in the money supply and the inflation, offsets; and (3)
Elimination of the source of money supply increases would, in itself, have done great that it can
much to reduce inflationary pressures. In the year following devaluation, fiscal restraint a
however, a sizable increase in imports further dampened the inflation, and To be sure,
Turkey experienced rates of inflation of less than 5 percent throughout the and an element
first half of the l960s. It is also noteworthy that real GNP increased, which harvests, in part
reflected the better utilization of resources made possible by imports of spare
tamthe price 1ev
parts and intermediate goods. harvests have c
The 1970 devaluation had an entirely different aftermath. The inflow of cases—most not
workers' remittances had a substantial impact on the money supply. Conse- What does s
quently the rate of inflation increased sharply after the 1970 devaluation. The inflation could 1
exchange rate change itself was used as the occasion to raise prices of products where there were
sold by several State Economic Enterprises. It is difficult to estimate what least in principle
would have happened to the rate of inflation had the central bank somehow jective, restrictiv
been able to sterilize the inflow of workers' remittances. What seems clear is liberalized enoul
that the greater part of inflationary pressure resulted from the accumulation of I wiseemerge. Th
foreign exchange reserves and the consequent increase in the money supply, pared to other ty
rather than from the devaluation itself. this project.
Price Level Behavior and Devaluation II. THE LEVEL
In an effort to summarize statistically the impact of devaluation on the price Another frequen
level, a simple price level determination model was fitted for each country, and followed by reces
coefficients for dummy variables were estimated for each of the four quarters
I
countsfor part o
following devaluation. The procedures used, and the results, are reported in to "devalue, cut
the appendix to this chapter. For present purposes, what is significant is that ply." It is widel
the sign of the coefficients of the dummies reflects the net direction of the balance-of-paym
change in the price level resulting from all influences other than the money sion, without
supply in the postdevaluation period. As such, they can be taken as being a eventual abandox
descriptive statistic of the average change in the rate of inflation experienced tion.THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIViTY 155
following the start of Phase III episodes after allowance is made for a simple
money-supply/price-level relationship. For the twenty-two Phase III episodes,
all signs were negative, although none was significant at a 95 percent con-
fidence level. This reinforces the impression from the country studies that, on
balance after taking account of monetary behavior, the average effect of other
influences was to dampen the rate of price increase.
Such a result does not imply that devaluation from a position of exchange
control is deflationary. It does, however, confirm the evidence from the in-
dividual studies that: (1) the popular interpretation of the extent of infla-
tionary pressure resulting from devaluation is greatly exaggerated; (2) while
the effect of devaluation itself may be to raise some prices, there are significant
offsets; and (3) the magnitude of the inflationary impact is not likely to be so
great that it cannot be offset by appropriate policies, including monetary and
fiscal restraint and liberalization of the flow of imports.
To be sure, circumstances vary from country to country and time to time,
and an element of luck is involved in the behavior of the price level. Bad
harvests, in particular, seem to have played havoc with some attempts to main-
tain the price level—as in India in 1966 and in South Korea in 1962—and good
harvests have contributed to a reduction in inflationary pressures in other
cases—most notably in Ghana.
What does seem clear is that rejecting devaluation because it might lead to
inflation could be rational only in very special circumstances or in a situation
where there were constraints on the adoption of other supporting policies.21 At
least in principle, to the extent that liberalization of the regime is a policy ob-
jective, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies could be adopted and imports
liberalized enough to offset the pressures on the price level that might other-
wise emerge. The contribution of exchange rate changes was very small com-
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II. THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Another frequent allegation made about devaluation is that it is likely to be
followed by recession, or at least a slowdown in the growth rate. This belief ac-
counts for part of the skepticism toward "IMF advice"—the recommendation
to "devalue, cut back government expenditures, and control the money sup-
ply." It is widely believed that such policies have not led to an improved
balance-of-payments situation and a higher rate of growth, but rather to reces-
sion, without visible and sustained balance-of-payments relief, and to the
eventual abandonment of the program with a resumption in the rate of infla-
tion.156 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
BackgroundConsiderations Table 8-2.R
-Surrounding I
Thereare very important questions about whether a slowdown in the rate of
growth necessarily accompanies successful transition from QRs to a liberalized
trade and payments regime, and—if so—what the magnitude of any such
slowdown might be. Answers to these questions hinge critically upon the tim
ingand magnitude of the longer-term response of exports to the altered regime
(and therefore on the maintenance of liberalization beyond the short run).
These issues are addressed in Chapter 10.
In this section the level of economic activity during the Phase III ex-
perience is reviewed. In some instances exogenous events following devalua-
tion resulted in a recession; in other cases inappropriate and overly restrictive
policy probably contributed to intensifying and prolonging retardation in the
rate of growth. Nonetheless, in the cases where there was some success in alter-
ing real exchange rates—that is, where inflation did not immediately wipe out
any effects devaluation might have had (as in Colombia following the devalua-
tion of November 1962)—there was a tendency toward slower growth, if not a
reduction in the level of economic activity. It was, however, much less pro-
nounced than is often alleged.
In reviewing the evidence from the country studies, it should be recalled
that lower income results in a downward shift in demand for imports at any
given import EER, thereby contributing to reduced premiums on import
licenses, less bias, and greater liberalization. It also permits shifting resources
toward the sectors whose profitability increases with reduction of variance and
bias. Later on it will be argued that import license premiums can be reduced at
lower cost through financing an immediate increase in the flow of imports by
foreign borrowing than by reducing domestic incomes, while the reallocation
of resources requires some slowdown in the pace of economic activity.
One other consideration deserves mention before proceeding. Although
attention here is focused on the relationship between a slowdown in the rate of
economic growth and the outcome of a Phase III episode, some of the
devaluation/liberalization episodes were accompaniments to the domestic goal
of halting inflation.Itis quite possible that recession beyond a certain
magnitude might not be a necessary part of the effort to shift to a liberalized
regime, but might be essential for the control of inflation. The issues involved
in that debate are well beyond the scope of the present study.
The evidence from the country studies, therefore, must be sifted with
regard to: (1) the magnitude of any recession; (2) the reasons for it; and (3) the
contribution, if any, that changes in the level of economic activity made to
liberalization of the trade and payments regime and to resource reallocation. It
may prove useful to start by providing data on real growth rates of GNP and
industrial production for periods during or surrounding each Phase III
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Egypt 1962 5.6 3.0 8.0 6.4 8.5 8.5 6.2 12.3
Ghana 1967 .9 .1 1.8 1.4 10.1 n.a. —.6 11.7
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Sources: U.N.Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,variousissues, exceptthat:
(1) Ghanaian industrial rates were derived from Leith, Table 111-3; (2) Egyptian data were
provided by Hansen; (3) Israeli data are from Michaely, Tables A-2 and A-9; and (4) Turkish
national income statistics, which were revised in 1973, were taken from the State Institute of
Statistics and used in computing trend rates.
aTrendratesarefortheperiods indicated: Brazil—1957: 1950-1960; 1961 and 1964:
1960-1966. Chile—1956 and 1959: 1950-1960; 1965: 1960-1965. Colombia—1951 and 1957:
1950-1960;1962and1965:1960-1965;1967:1960-1970.
Ghana—1963-1966for GNP and1962-1966forindustrialactivity.India—1960-1966.
Israel—1952:1950-1960; 1962:1960-1966. South Korea—1960-1966. Philippines— 1960:
1950-1960; 1970: 1965-1970. Turkey—1958: 1953-1958; 1970: 1965-1970.
each country is discussed. As a basis for comparison, the first column on each
side of Table 8-2 gives the trend rate—that is, the average annual rate of growth
of real GNP and industrial activity, respectively. The exact periods used for
the trend are indicated in the notes to the table. The next three columns on158 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
each side of the table give the rate of growth for the year before, the year of, the GDP deflat and the year after devaluation. Thus, for example, in Chile the annual average
rate of growth of real ONP was 2.7 percent for the period 1950-1960. GNP in annual percent(
195,9—the year of devaluation—exceeded 1958 GNP by 2.5 percent, and 1960 respectively, wi
GNP fell 1.5 percent from its 1959 level. What is op
long as it did. F
Recession in Individual Countries on liberalizatioi
increased somei
Any single statistic, particularly an annual one, cannot adequately indicate the excess industria
level of economic activity. It is more appropriate, therefore, to interpret the agricultural oul





The 1957 Brazilian Phase III episode does not appear to have affectedthe previous period
rapid pace of economic growth in that country. Although the 1961 Phase III the adoption of
was accompanied by restrictive monetary policy for about half a year, Fishlow of the late 1960
noted that the policy did not have any adverse effects on the level of real out-
put. Table 8-2 reflects the absence of any significant change in the level of CHILE
economic activity during either Phase III period.
It is the Brazilian experience after 1964 that warrants attention. In 1965
, Chile'sPh
not only were GNP growth and industrial production well below trend levels, tions. The after
but slow growth continued throughout the next several years. Indeed, Phase rate of growth
III is judged to have continued until 1968. By any standard there was a signifi- however,
cant recession, in the sense that output over the period as a whole was substan- tion and liberal
tially below trend. The recession was not accompanied by high and rising accompanied b:
unemployment for, as Fishlow demonstrates, real wages fell during the period, in output. Behi
The authorities consistently underestimated the rate of price increase in corn- volved with sel
puting the permitted wage rate, which fell 20 percent in real terms over the
four years.22 The short-run
Several factors are important in understanding the Brazilian recession, negative. Incr
Perhaps most important is that the primary policy objective was to control in-
availability of
trade barriers
flation through restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. Liberalization of im- competitive in
ports resulted from success in attaining the primary goal, not the other way 'dustries with
around, as Fishlow describes: liberalization a
Another p
This internal stabilization strategy was not the counterpart 'of a more realistic set the contrac
commercial policy designed to restore external equilibrium by curbing domestic The obvious p
consumption. Rather, the sequence was the opposite. Slower growth directed to the Frei progri
stem inflation had as a secondary consequence substantially reduced import de- capacity utiliz
mand, and thus made liberalizing measures possible.23 limited by a pr
would reduce i There is no doubt that the government was successful in achieving its primary initial success,
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the GDP deflator was 78 percent in 1963 and 88 percent in 1964; thereafter the
annual percentage increases were 55, 39, 27, 28, and 22 for 1965 through 1969,
respectively, with rates slightly lower than that in the subsequent four years.24
What is open to question is whether the period of stagnation had to last as
long as it did. Fishlow clearly believes that it did not. Until 1967, emphasis was
on liberalization of imports. The bias toward import substitution had actually
increased somewhat since 1961. Although exports rose, they did so because of
excess industrial capacity induced by the recession and also because of larger
agricultural output.25 Only in 1967 did policy shift toward encouraging ex-
ports. At that time Antonio Delfirn Netto assumed office as finance minister.
His policy stance differed from the earlier one in that he believed that a more
expansionary policy would lead to more growth and less inflation; Fishlow
that this policy would have been more appropriate during the
previous period, as well. This was the start of the emphasis on exporting and
the adoption of the policies that led to Brazil's rapid growth and export boom
of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
CHILE
Chile's Phase III experiences all were motivated by domestic considera-
tions. The aftermath of the first Phase III episode, in 1957/58, was the highest
rate of growth of real GDP of any postwar phase.2' This rapid growth,
however, appears to have been prompted by reasons other than the devalua-
tion and liberalization. The second and third Phase III episodes, which were
accompanied by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, both saw a reduction
in output. Behrman's conclusions are indicative of some of the problems in-
volved with selecting appropriate monetary and fiscal policy:
The short-run impact of both devaluation and liberalization on output was
negative. Increased competition from imports more than offset the greater
availability of imported inputs. This effect could have been lessened by lowering
trade barriers immediately on noncompetitive imports and only more slowly on
competitive imports. To do so, however, would have left many inefficient in-
dustries with even greater protection.It also might have made the whole
liberalization attempt seem less credible.
Another possibility would have been to use fiscal and monetary policy to off-
set the contractionary impetus of liberalization. This was done in 1965 and 1966.
The obvious problem is that such a strategy increases inflationary pressures. In
the Frei program (following the 1965 Phase III] the government tried to increase
capacity utilization and growth by expansionary fiscal and monetary policy
limited by a programmed decline in the rate of inflation. The latter, it was hoped,
would reduce inflationary expectations despite the booming economy. There was
initial success, but momentum could not be maintained for more than a year or160 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
COLOMBIA
The 1951 Phase III episode in Colombia was not analyzed in detail by
D(az, and it is omitted from Table 8-3forthat reason. Of Colombia's other
four Phase III experiences, the 1962 experience was followed by inflation and
is not relevant to issues under consideration here.28
The 1957 devaluation was accompanied by restrictive monetary and fiscal
policy, and the result was a pronounced slowdown in the rate of growth; per
capita real GDP fell in the year following devaluation. Given the restrictive
policies accompanying devaluation, Di'az expressed surprise that the impact on
the growth rate was not greater.
The 1965 and 1967 Phase Ills do not appear to have had any negative im-
pact on the level of economic activity. Growth rates of investment, manufac-
turing, and GNP rose somewhat in 1966 and and recession simply does
not appear to have been a factor in those cases.
EGYPT
Egypt's net devaluation was only 3 percent and it was followed by expan-
sionary monetary and fiscal policy. The Egyptian experience does not provide
any evidence on the macroeconomic impact of devaluation.3'
GHANA
INDIA SOUTH KORE.
India suffered a prolonged and severe recession in the two years following
the devaluation. The principal reason for it was the drought, with the conse-
As in the Brazilian case the recession in Chile was more a result of the
restraint necessary to break inflationary pressures than of liberalization; had
inflation not been a problem, expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could
have been used to offset the deflationary effect of increased imports. Unlike
Brazil's prolonged Phase II period following her 1964 devaluation, however,





































The fiscal and monetary policy of Ghana had been restrictive for a year
prior to devaluation. The motive for further restrictiveness was that "ap-
parently the authorities expected the impact of the devaluation to be infla-
tionary. This expectation arose in part from a failure to recognize the poten-
tially deflationary effect of the devaluation.
It appears that the ability of producers to expand output as they obtained
imports of intermediate goods and spare parts resulted in a net expansion of
industrial production. Real income rose in Ghana in the two years following
devaluation, as the figures in Table 8-3 indicate, although the trend growth
rate for that country is painfully low.
South Korea
pressures are rep
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quent decline in agricultural production. Monetary and fiscal policy were also
restrictive, primarily because the government feared that expenditures or other
expansionary actions would only accelerate the increase in food prices.33
Bhagwati and Srinivasan do not believe that monetary and fiscal policies
were restrictionist because of the devaluation, although they noted that it was
apparent that some individuals expected devaluation to be inflationary: In
their opinion,
This view ignores one critical element in LDC devaluations—namely, that the in-
flow of aid.implies that the immediate effect of the devaluation is likely to be
significantly deflationary because imports often exceed exports by a factor of
even two. Also, the fact that the net, as distinct from the gross, devaluation was
not quite as great as was commonly believed ... impliedthat any need for such a
compensatory deflationary policy was correspondingly less, ceteris paribus.34
When Bhagwati and Srinivasan examined the impact of the devaluation
itself on the level of economic activity, they concluded that it was mildly
positive. Among the import-intensive industries (chemicals, metal-based in-
dustries, and art silk manufactures), chemicals production was able to increase
significantly. Devaluation stimulated production in the capital goods in-
dustries, but that effect was more than offset by the decline in demand
resulting from the government's cutback in its purchases of capital goods and
the drought-induced decline in the level of income. While the monetary and
fiscal policy of the Indian government can be criticized on grounds that a more
expansionary policy might have permitted an increase in the level of industrial
activity and investment, the recession that followed the 1966 devaluation must
be judged to have resulted from factors exogenous to the devaluation and
liberalization.35
ISRAEL
Israel's average annual rate of growth of real GNP over the period 1950 to
1970 was 10.5 percent, and the economy operated at a full employment level
virtually throughout theperiod.Michaely's discussion focuses on the
monetary and fiscal policies accompanying devaluation and their ability to
contain excess demand. The only recessions experienced in Israel during the
two decades were in 1953, after the shift in policies, and in 1965. There was no
recession after the 1962 devaluation. Michaely attributes the 1953 recession to
the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies designed to control domestic infla-
tion.36
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea also experienced very rapid growth, and no deflationary
pressures are reported for either Phase IH, although the rate of inflation wa5
reduced after 1964. The relatively low growth rate for 1962, reported in Table
161 j
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8-2,reflectsthe influence of a bad harvest rather than a recession. The expan-
sionary monetary and fiscal policy followed during 1961/62 resulted in excess
demand pressures. Certainly there is nO evidence that recessionary tendencies
accompanied either of the South Korean devaluations.37
THE PHILIPPINES
The two Philippine Phase III episodes were distinctly different in their
origins. The first was designed to shift from QRs to pricing measures to pro-
tect domestic industry and was not intended to reduce the bias of the regime.
Demand management policies do not seem to have been at issue. As Baldwin
reported:
Many import-competing manufacturing activities were, of course, adversely af-
fected by the liberalization because manufacturers who had directly imported raw
materials and capital goods at the exchange rate of P2 to the dollar and thus had
reaped the windfall gain themselves now were faced with higher input costs.
The average annual rate of growth in the manufacturing sector declined from 7.7
per cent between 1957 and 1959 ... to3.8 per cent from 1960 to 1962. ..
.
Accordingto Baldwin, while there was some shift in incentives following the
1960 devaluation, it was not sufficient to induce resources to move into export
industries. The result was a"stagnation" of industrial activity as import-
competing activities were cut back and there was nothing to replace them. The
immediate downward pressure on the level of economic activity appears to
have been less important, however, than the fact that industrial activity con-
tinued to grow at relatively low rates over the next several years.
The 1970 devaluation was entirely different, starting as it did from a situa-
tion in which there was sizable excess aggregate demand. Government policies
were restrictionist in the period immediately following devaluation. However,
the government was apparently concerned over price increases, and there is no
report of a slowdown in economic activity. The overall conclusion must be
that short-run recession has not been a part of the Philippines' experience with
devaluation and its aftermath."
TURKEY
Although reports on the level of economic activity following the 1958
devaluation indicated that there was a recession in Turkey, real GNP increased
5percentin 1959 over its 1958 level. This was mostly due to an expansion of in-
dustrial output in response to the increased availability of imports. To be sure,
tight money conditions led to outcries, and some of the import-competing in-
dustries that had sprung up during the exchange control period were closed
down. But in light of the combined deflationary impact of the monetary and
fiscal policy, ho
real output is rei















it is difficult to Ii
pact that did re
policies designed
Several COfl(

















term responses tTHE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 163
fiscal policy, however, along with augmented flow of imports, the increase in
real output is remarkable. Even such adjustments as did occur appear to have
been over in a relatively short period of time—within a year following the
devaluation. At about that time, however, monetary and fiscal policy signals
were reversed and highly expansionist policies were pursued until 1960.
Following a reversion to tight money after May 1960, there was a significant
slowdown in the pace of economic activity,but it is difficult to attribute that to
the devaluation. The 1970 experience, likewise, was almost completely devoid
of any recession. The major problem was inflation in the period following the
devaluation.40
Evaluation of the Evidence
Overall, only three of the twenty-two Phase III episodes—Brazil after 1964,
Colombia after 1957, and India after 1966—can be said to have been followed
by a severe recession of prolonged duration. The Indian recession appears to
have resulted from factors almost entirely independent of the devaluation, and
the Colombian from the stabilization program adopted. While other coun-
tries—most notably Chile—also experienced slowdowns in their growth rates,
it is difficult to label them recessions. Moreover, much of the deflationary im-
pact that did result apparently stemmed more from domestic stabilization
policies designed to reduce the rate of inflation.
Several conclusions seem warranted. First, and perhaps most important,
is that recession need not accompany successful liberalization (as evidenced by
South Korea's experience). It has not been universal, and where it did occur it
was less pronounced than seems popularly supposed. Second, it would appear
that application of monetary and fiscal restraint is likely to lead to a retarda-
tion of growth; this may be an inevitable cost of attempting to break infla-
tionary expectations. Third, while there are some elements of a liberalization
effort—including any increase in the flow of imports—that are likely to be
deflationary, those elements may have offsetting effects that permit increases
in real output. To a certain extent the stimulus of increased real output
associated with higher imports of intermediate goods may counteract the ab-
sorption of domestic purchasing power by increased imports of finished
goods. Finally, there is evidence that changing the bias of the regime must
result in some dislocation in economic activity; when bias toward import-
substitution industries is reduced, their profitability will diminish. If the pro-
fitability of other activities is not sufficiently increased, longer-term stagnation
may result. Parts of the Brazilian, Chilean, and Philippine experiences suggest
this interpretation, and it is an issue to which attention will return after longer-
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III. SHORT-TERM BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS RESPONSE availability of fc
tamwhatever 1
if a devaluation is to result in permanent reduction in restriction and bias, foreign
other than in the trivial sense that failure to devalue would have meant greater of financing nel
restrictiveness and bias, foreign exchange receipts must at some point start liberalization
growing at a rate not signficantly different from the rate of growth of demand would also depe:
for imports of goods and services.4' Should foreign exchange receipts not grow Before revic
at about that rate, QRs must become increasingly restrictive in order to con- by the country S
tamforeign exchange expenditures at levels permitted by receipts.42 response to deva
Generally, such growth of foreign exchange earnings depends on the rate reliability of inf4
of growth of exports. While private foreign capital flows, aid receipts, and reasons that are
tourist income can offset a deficit in the trade balance, their rate of growth is statistics about
closely related to how well export earnings are performing: foreign investors ., receiptsare
are generally unwilling to lend if exports are relatively stagnant; aid receipts of Phase III epis
usually do not grow rapidly; and other sources of foreign exchange are usually terpreting the da
determined by much the same set of variables as exports themselves. tion before proo
A major purpose of devaluation with its accompanying reduction in bias
and variance is to reallocate, resources so as to increase production of export-
ables. But that sort of resource reallocation may not take place instantaneous- The Validity of
ly for various reasons: (1) investors are very likely to wait to see if the new in-
centives created by the devaluation will continue; (2) it takes time to decide to One of the key f
create new capacity; (3) there are further lags as plant and equipment are detailed regulati
ordered and installed; and (4) additional time may be needed for developing strong incentives
foreign markets.43 recorded chang
The short run, therefore, can be taken as the period during which response to alte
resources might begin to shift, but it does not extend to the period when export changes represen
earnings start growing out of the capacity created in response to the altered "true figures" a
bias of the regime. Such a period is clearly perilous; if export earnings are not the extent of su
increasing, it is difficult to sustain the liberalization, and it is also likely that misrecording can
skepticism about prospects for its success will develop. This is the period dur- There are
ing which many of the costs—including whatever price level increases and created, and they
reductions in the rate of growth that result from devaluation—are incurred, there are incenti
but the longer-term benefits that could result are not yet realized, channels, as wit
There are a number of factors that could provide foreign exchange to sup- remove those tra
port the liberalization during this period: counterspeculative flows following are numerous inc
devaluation; the use of excess capacity, resulting from the depressed domestic where there has
market, to produce more exports; reduced imports because of domestic reces- travel abroad for
sion; relatively quick responses in markets without long gestation lags, such as the requirement f
tourism; and even fortuitous improvements in the prices of major export corn- the black market.
modities or good weather. repatriated legall
The magnitude of these favorable factors and also the length of time re- through overinvo'
quired for longer-run adjustments to take place are important considerations exports. In such
when a devaluation-and-liberalization effort is debated by policyrnakers. The balance-of-paym
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availability of foreign exchange is the major determinant of the ability to sus-
tamwhatever liberalization accompanies devaluation until such time as
foreign exchange earnings start growing. Estimates of the probable magnitude
of financing needed for any particular liberalization, or of the.amount of
liberalization that could be permitted with a given level of available financing,
would also depend on these factors.
Before reviewing the experience following the Phase III episodes covered
by the country studies, there is one general topic, relevant for analysis of the
response to devaluation from exchange controls, that should be explored: the
reliability of information about the short-term response to devaluation. For
reasons that are inherent in the nature of exchange control regimes, official
statistics about shifts in the country's foreign exchange expenditures and
receipts are likely to be unreliable. Because of that, interpretation of the results
of Phase III episodes requires extreme care, and the difficulties involved in in-
terpreting the data are sufficiently significant that they Warrant special atten-
tion before proceeding.
The Validity of Official Statistics
One of the key features of Phase II regimes is that QRs, high tariffs, and the
detailed regulations surrounding foreign currency transactions all provide
strong incentives for false invoicing and evasion. In all probability, part of the
recorded change inofficialstatisticsfollowing devaluation reflects the
response to altered incentives to misrecord transactions; not all recorded
changes represent altered real flows. In the nature of the case there are no
"true figures" against which the official statistics can be gauged to estimate
the extent of such misreading, so the probable direction and magnitude of
misrecording can only be inferred.
There are all sorts of ways in which incentives for misrecording are
created, and they all have their impact on balance-of-payments statistics. First,
there are incentives for completely avoiding transactions through official
channels, as with black market operations and smuggling; the effect is to
remove those transactions from the official payments statistics. Second, there
are numerous incentives to misclassify transactions. For example, in countries
where there has been a tax on nationals' purchases of foreign exchange for
travel abroad for pleasure, there have been incentives to misstate the nature of
the requirement for foreign currency and also to purchase foreign exchange in
the black market. When there are controls on the amount of funds that can be
repatriated legally, foreign firms have an incentive to transfer their profits
through overinvoicing the imports from their parent firms and underinvoicing
exports. In such instances the "profit and dividend remittances" item in
balance-of-payments accounts should be higher than is in fact recorded, and166 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
"exports" should be higher and "imports" lower. There are also incentives to
misclassify commodity trade among various categories; this might result in
recorded changes in the commodity composition of trade but is less likely to
result in apparent changes in the trade or current account balance.
Finally, the recorded value of various transactions may be false. Con-
sider, for example, an exportable eligible for a cash subsidy. The existence of
the cash subsidy provides an incentive for overstatingthevalue of the export.
When there is also a black market, however, the black market premium pro-
vides an incentive for underrecording because underinvoicing the export will
enable the exporter to keep part of his foreign currency proceeds. Symmetric
arguments apply to the valuation of imports; high duties provide an incentive
for underinvoicing, and black markets provide an inducement to overinvoice.
In the cases of misclassifying or failing to record transactions, theory provides
reasonable a priori predictions as to the likely direction of misrecording.
Therefore, some inferences may be drawn about the probable change follow-
ing devaluation. The picture is somewhat more obscure where values are
misrepresented, because there is no apriori basisfor estimating the bias in the
official estimates of changes in transactions.
With devaluation and the accompanying simplification and unification of
rates, it is likely that the volume of such misrecording will decline, sometimes
sharply. As already seen in Table 6-4, black market premiums tend to decline,
often drastically, after devaluation. The replacement of export subsidies
reduces the incentive for overstating the value of exports. In India, for exam-
ple, there had apparently been considerable overinvoicing of exports ("paper
exports") for purposes of obtaining cash subsidies, import entitlements, and
other privileges accruing to exporters in proportion to their declared value of
exports. With the devaluation and the removal of export subsidies in June
1966, the incentive for overinvoicing was removed. Simultaneously, expecta-
tions formed that export subsidies would quickly be reintroduced into the
system. Indian data show a decline in the rupee value of exports immediately
following the 1966 devaluation. In view of the nature of the incentives it is im-
possible to estimate the extent to which exports actually dropped in anticipa-
tion of the resumption of export subsidies, and how much of the apparent
decline was really a decline in overinvoicing.
An interesting question arises over the real impact of a change in the
prevalence of misrecorded transactions. Assume, for the moment, that after
devaluation there was no change in trade flows, but that the magnitude of false
invoicing and of evasion did change. A number of real effects could result, in-
cluding increased tariff revenues, reduced subsidy payments for "paper" ex-
ports, and an increased flow of foreign exchange through official channels.
Whether, in any of these circumstances, the devaluation improved welfare
would depend on two things: (1) the marginal social product of foreign ex-
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private sector relative to the public sector; and (2) the saving, if any, in
resources that had earlier been employed to evade regulations. Evaluation of
the relative productivity of resources in the hands of the private or the public
sector is subjective, and there is no empirical evidence about possible orders of
magnitude of resources employed in evading the regime. On balance there is
probably a presumption that there is a net welfare improvement—there is
clearly some resource saving—and it is not evident that government behavior is
so finely constrained that a net increase in foreign exchange held by the central
bank or in revenue received by the finance ministry will, in fact, result in in-
creased expenditures by the public sector.
Short-Term Responses in Individual Countries
BRAZIL
Brazil's 1957 devaluation reduced balance-of-payments pressures in the
short run primarily by increasing domestic protection against imports (which
declined in dollar value from $1,285 million in 1957 to $1,179 million in 1958)
and by the receipt of $375 million from the IMF.44 It will be recalled that this
was the era during which Brazil received sizable long-term private capital in-
flows, reaching $250 million1957.
Fishlow believes that the short-term response to the 1957 devaluation was
an improvement in the balance-of-payments situation, but that the failure to
alter the bias of the regime, combined with falling prices of Brazil's exports on
world markets, led to stagnant export earnings, which were $1,558 million in
1954, $1,392 million in 1957, and below $1,300 million in each subsequent year
until 1961. Brazil's 1957 devaluation would appear to have temporarily removed
some payments pressures, and thus it was satisfactory in the short run but a
failure in the longer run.
The 1961 Phase II was aimed at increasing real EERs, especially for ex-
ports. Fishlow analyzed the short-term response as follows:
There was a gratifying immediate improvement in the balance of payments.
Non-coffee exports increased in volume and value. Even more important quan-
titatively, there was a renewed inflow of capital; official long-term inflows
generated a positive net balance for the first time since the early 1950s. Reserves
were augmented in 1961 by $178 million.4'
The new Brazilian government shifted toward inflationary policies in the last
part of 1961, and the real exchange rate rapidly eroded. As in 1957, the short-
term response was satisfactory but short-lived because of domestic policies.
The 1964 experience was entirely different. In that case there had been
pressing debt repayment obligations, with a third of the total debt of $3.9168 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE HI
billion coming due in 1964. The devaluation was accompanied by debt
rescheduling which was "a more significant factor in restoring balance-of-
payments equilibrium" than were current account changes.46 The domestic
slowdown, however, resulted in a sharp decrease in the demand for imports.
The trade balance changed from an average annual deficit of $133 million in
1961-1963 to an average surplus of $304 million in 1964-1966. Reduced im-
ports accounted for $189 million of this change, and increased exports, $248
million. Fishlow attributes both of these shifts primarily to domestic recession.
Although the increase in exports after the devaluation was larger in ab-
solute magnitude than the reduction in imports (compared to 1961-1963), it is
important to recognize that imports would have grown, rather than declined,
had the Brazilian economy maintained its momentum during those years.
Fishlow, therefore, computed the average import savings resulting from reduc-
ed income by estimating an import demand equation and calculating what im-
ports might have been if GDP had grown at an average annual rate of 6 per-
cent. Using those relations, his estimate is that because of the domestic reces-
sion, imports were lower by an annual average of $290 million, compared to
what they would have been with 6 percent growth and the same EERs.4'
According to Fishlow it was the large reduction in import demand, com-
bined with the inflow of external assistance, that paved the way for reform of
the import regime. Brazil was able to use much of the external assistance to
reschedule and pay off foreign indebtedness; the foreign aid had a substantial
grant component, so the effect was similar to partial cancellation of the debt.
The fact that debt repayment obligations were no longer pressing meant that
the government could proceed with the dismantling of the elaborate protec-
tive structure that had been laboriously constructed to discourage import de-
mand. Because of the improved payments situation, the price of imports was
lowered as part of the liberalization strategy, rather than increased; the wedge
between import and export exchange rates was reduced on the import side... ."
Itwas not until 1967 that policies to stimulate export growth were initiated. In
the Brazilian case the "short term" was three years, and liberalization was sus-
tained during most of this period by depressed levels of domestic income.
CHILE
Of prime importance in understanding the outcomes of all three of Chile's
Phase III episodes is the fact that they were intended, at least partially, to
result in a reduction in inflation. Imports were liberalized as part of each anti-
inflation program. As described by Behrman,
In all three cases, then, net inflows of official foreign credits played important
short-run roles. In the first two programs they allowed the liberalization efforts to
be prolonged. I
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be prolonged. In the third they helped it to get started. In no case, however, did
they lead to long-run success. In the long run, in fact, they may have been
dysfunctional by obscuring the fact that the exchange rate remained well below
equilibrium.
All three Phase III episodes had some other features in common. In each,
inventories were reduced following devaluation and there was less capital
flight; both nontraditional exports and net direct investment increased. Even
so, the increased flow of imports predominated, so that deficits on current ac-
count increased following the first two Phase III episodes. After the third, the
increased price of copper enabled Chile to maintain import liberalization,
despite the failure of exports to respond in as great a measure as imports. The
first two liberalization efforts ended when further foreign credits were
unavailable to sustain them.
So while selected components of Chile's balance of payments improved in
the postdevaluation period, the changes were not sufficient to offset the in-
creased flows of imports that liberalized the regime. When foreign credits were
no longer forthcoming, and exports had not increased sufficiently, Chile
reverted to Phase II exchange controls for lack of an alternative.'0
COLUMBIA
Columbia's 1951 devaluation was followed by immediate and sustained
improvement in the balance of payments, which resulted primarily from the
high price of coffee exports. Increased foreign exchange earnings were used to
continue relaxation of import controls, and this situation continued into
Like the 1965 Chilean episode, the primary factor involved in main-
taining the liberalization was the fortunate circumstance of a favorable world
market; there was no sustained growth of exports.
The 1957 devaluation was of a completely different. character—the
primary motive was to cut imports. Imports in 1957/58 were one-third below
their 1955/56 level as the rate of gross domestic capital formation in
machinery and equipment fell in half. Despite declining coffee earnings a cur-
rent account surplus emerged. According to that surplus was used to pay
off arrears in indebtedness. The short-run result of the 1957 devaluation was
therefore a sharp improvement in the balance of payments, which is partly hid-
den in the official record because the improvement was primarily used for debt
repayment.
The 1962 devaluation was followed by an inflation so severe that the real
exchange rate at the end of 1963 was only 4 percent above its predevaluation
Diaz does not even consider the short-run impact on the balance of
payments, except to note that intended liberalization of imports was quickly
aborted and that reliance upon QRs increased thereafter.53 Inspection of Col-
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ombian statistics shows reduced imports in1963, but those figures are
presumably a response to tightened exchange control. It seems doubtful that
there was time enough for any response to the 1962 effort.
In contrast the 1965 devaluation was accompanied by significant import
liberalization. Prior licensing was removed on more than half of all imports,
advance import deposit requirements were relaxed, imports for the first three
quarters of 1966 were 49 percent above their 1965 level, while export earnings
declined about I The liberalization of imports was financed primari-
ly from loans received at the time of the 1965 devaluation. Under these cir-
cumstances, as the credits were used up and inflation eroded the effect of the
earlier alteration of the nominal exchange rate, the Colombian authorities had
either to borrow again from international agencies or to resort to renewed ex-
change controls; they opted for the latter course in November 1966. As Diaz
reported:
Most observers now agree that by October 1966 stocks of imported goods were
bulging, and a downturn in imports (even at the existing exchange rate) was immi-
nent. A good share of the increase in imports during 1966 had been motivated by
a speculative desire to take advantage of a liberalization not expected to last
long..
Importsfell sharply between 1966 and 1967 but were once again liberalized
with the 1967 devaluation. Unlike the earlier efforts, however, export earnings
began growing in the following year, and the liberalization could be sustained.
In the Colombian'case it would appear that all Phase III episodes, except
that of 1957, were intended to liberalize imports; liberalization was initially
financed by foreign credits received at the time of devaluation and, except for
1967, the episodes ended when these credits were exhausted.
EGYPT
Once again the very small magnitude of Egypt's net devaluation preclud-
ed any substantial effects, except in the sense that devaluation was the price
paid for a loan from the IMF. The Egyptian government had approached the
IMF because it was faced with payments difficulties and with the prospect that
they would intensify. Receipt of the loan of LE 20 million prevented increased
restrictivenessastheEgyptianbalanceofpaymentscontinuedto
deteriorate—as anticipated—in the following year.
GHANA
Leith examined separately the impact of Ghana's devaluation on non-
cocoa exports, cocoa exports, imports, private capital flows, and official
capital flows.
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For noncocoa exports the response was somewhat slow. Leith estimated
an export supply function for these commodities; in the first year following
devaluation, actual exports fell short by 8.8 percent of those predicted and, for
the second year, by 3 percent. Leith interprets this result to mean that en-
trepreneurs were waiting to see if the new price signals would in fact be main-
tained—a finding tending to support the view that the export response may be
slow. Inflationary pressures had reemerged by 1969, so that the new real rate
was greatly eroded. According to Leith's estimate, noncocoa exports were
about 14 percent greater than they would otherwise have been by 1969/70. If
however, comparison is simply made between noncocoa exports before and
after devaluation, the conclusion is much less sharp: in 1969/70, noncocoa ex-
ports had merely reattained their level of
For cocoa exports the impact of devaluation depended on the extent to
• which the alteration in the exchange rate affected the producer price, which
was, after all, separately administered. In fact, the nominal cocoa price did in-
crease 30 percent, but within the following three years that increase was erased
• by domestic inflation. Moreover, the producer price, even after devaluation,
was below the level at which it would pay to make new plantings; it was
estimated that NC9.00 was the minimum price at which capacity would be ex-
panded, and the producer price increased only from NC5.00 to NC6.50.58
On the import side the QR mechanism continued to prevail after devalua-
tion, so that the level of imports was a function of the value of licenses issued
and not of the exchange rate. Imports dropped from $320 million to $265
million from 1966 to 1967. Leith's import demand function contains only
GDP and a dummy variable for the years in which licensing predominated; he
considers that price was not the determining factor either before or after the
devaluation, so the behavior of imports cannot be attributed to the devalua-
tion."
Private capital flows fluctuated widely from year to year in Ghana but do
not appear to have had any direct relationship to devaluation. Leith identified
official capital flows as the major component influenced by the devaluation:
Official capital flows, paradoxically, are more sensitive to the exchange rate.
Determined in part by the development "needs" of the recipient but also in part
by the donor's sense of the appropriateness of the recipient's policies, they are af-
fected to a substantial degree by the visible measurable policy changes in the
"correct" direction.... Thiswas in part the view taken by major OECD donor
countries in response to the Ghanaian 1967 devaluation. A moderate inflow for
1966 to support the new NLC government was doubled in 1967 and more than
redoubled in 1968.•.
Onbalance the improvement in Ghana's current account was rather mild: the
deficit fell from $125 million in 1966, to $84 million in 1967, and to $56 million
in 1968. The chief short-term impact, therefore, was in capital flows, with a
tightening of imports also playing a role.
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INDIA
India's current account deficit was over $1 billion in 1966 and 1967 as ex-
port earnings were relatively stagnant and below their 1965 level, while imports
were liberalized. The liberalization was more a function of licensing decisions
than of the devaluation, although import premiums fell sharply. The Indian
recession resulted in a downward shift in the demand for imports and released
domestic supplies for exports, so that exports began increasing in 1968 while
imports were declining, with a consequent improvement in the current account
balance.
The large current account deficits of 1966 and 1967 were financed by
substantial aid inflows, which amounted to about $1.5 billion in each year.6' It
was those flows which, together with the exchange rate change and domestic
recession, permitted import liberalization. But as soon as domestic income
began increasing again, premiums on import licenses again began rising
sharply. 62 It would thus appear that the short-run response to devaluation was
import liberalization and offsetting aid inflows.
ISRAEL
Israel's experience differs from most of the others in a number of regards,
most notably in that there was no reliance on foreign credits. The first Israeli
Phase III episode was designed to liberalize the trade and payments regime,
replacing QRs with price measures. The episode is the more remarkable
because the increased import EER was sufficient not only to absorb premiums
on import licenses but also to reduce the quantity of imports despite growing
real income. Michaely reports that
[for]... thefirst half of the 1950s ... thequantities of exports and imports
seem clearly to respond to the price movements, which in this period were both
large and consistent. During the three years 1952-54, the exchange
rate increased at an average annual rate of 25.3 percent.... Theaverage annual
increase of exports ... was22.8 percent in the years 1952-54, versus 5.3 percent
for all other years. In 1952-55, the average annual change in the exchange rate for
imports rose 22.8 percent; the quantity index fell 9.8 percent.
Inboth Israeli devaluations the response of exports to altered real EERs has
lagged more than the response of imports.64 For the first devaluation, success
wassufficientfor Michaely toreportthat"the balance-of-payments
position ...ceasedto be the major basisfortrade and payments
restriction."6' This shift appears to have been largely the result of changes in
current flows; the import surplus fell from $359 million in 1951 to $238 million
in 1954 despite an increase in autonomous capital flows.
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adopted in anticipation of future payments difficulties and because expan-
sionist monetary and fiscal policies offset much of its effects.66. Foreign ex-
change reserves were high and rising when the devaluation was undertaken.
Total autonomous capital imports appear to have remained relatively constant
over the 1962-1965 period, and it is apparent that, for Israel, those imports are
largely independent of the exchange rate. Exports of goods and services rose
rapidly in the year or two following devaluation, but no more so than they had
in the two years prior to devaluation. Import growth was reduced to 5 percent
in 1963, probably reflecting in part the impact of devaluation.
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea's two devaluations were designed to liberalize imports
primarily by raising the real import EER; in the 1961 devaluation the real ex-
port EER actually fell from the preceding year. The rapid export growth that
marked South Korea's development in the 1960s started after 1959, and the
government's policy of subsidizing exports resulted in the devaluation having
relatively little effect on exports (which rose from $33 million in 1960 to $55
million in 1962, and from $87 million in 1963 to $175 million in 1965). A
realistic exchange rate policy was clearly a necessary condition for the rapid
growth of exports, but that policy was carried out over the entire decade, not
just at moments of devaluation.
The 1961 devaluation resulted in a 30 percent increase in the real import
EER and a consequent cutback in imports from $395 million in 1960 to $283
million in 1961. Liberalization was carried out via the transfer of commodities
to the automatic approval list. But monetary and fiscal policies were expan-
sionary, and multiple exchange rates and quantitative restrictions were again
imposed in 1963 in order to contain imports. The 1964 devaluation was not
dissimilar. A 25 percent increase in the real import EER left a still lower real
rate than had been achieved in 1961. Imports were again cut back from $497
million in 1963 to $365 million in 1964, and again licensing was relaxed. In
both devaluations the net goods and services account deficit was smaller than
it had been in preceding years.
Itis noteworthy that official grant aid was declining throughout the
period, and by 1964 it stood at less than half its average level of the late
1950s.67 Net capital inflows do not appear to have been very responsive to
devaluations, either, although private capital became important in the late
1960s. Like so many other aspects of the South Korean experience, it was not
devaluation itself but the maintenance of policy stances and gradual ad-
justments in key variables that explain performance.
j
THE PHILIPPINES
The 1960 Philippine devaluation was intended to alter the regime by
replacing QRs with a higher effective exchange rate, especially with respect to174 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
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Exports quickly increased after the currency depreciation. Their value had re-
mained at around $850 million from 1966 through 1969 but rose 24 percent to
$1,062 million in 1970. In volume terms, exports, which had actually fallen about
5 percent between 1966 and 1969, rose 14 percent between 1969 and 1970. These
favorable performances in value and volume terms continued in 1971. .
.•'°
Meanwhile,tight monetary and fiscal policy, combined with continued con-
trols over payments in foreign exchange, resulted in a decline of $40 million in
the dollar value of imports following devaluation. The net result was a
decrease in the trade deficit from $276 million in 1969 and $28 million and $64
million in 1970 and 1971, respectively.7'
Thus the initial short-term response of the balance of payments was
favorable because of the receipt of additional credits. Beyond that immediate
impact, however, the Phillippines experience appears to be somewhat unusual
in the rapidity with which the trade balance, and especially exports, responded
to the alteration in exchange rates.
TURKEY
The 1958 Turkish devaluation was prompted by arreas in foreign in-
debtedness, and—as in so many other countries—the devaluation was accom-
imports. During the 1960-1963 period, when these shifts were occurring, the
value of imports remained virtually constant. The commodity composition of
imports changed, however, with a shift toward commodities that had
previously been subject to tight restrictions. Baldwin estimates that quantities
of "essential" producer and consumer goods fell 3 and 13 percent, respective-
ly, between 1959 and 1962, while semi-essential producer goods imports fell 18
percent. Imports classified as nonessential consumer goods—the category
previously subject to most severe restriction—rose 19 percent.'8 Examination
of Philippine balance-of-payments statistics does not indicate any systematic
change in capital flows, private or official, and Baldwin does not discuss the
short-term behavior of the balance of payments. Perhaps the important point
is that the 1960 devaluation was not intended to affect the payments position
and, in the short run, it did not do so.
The 1970 devaluation was entirely different. Debt repayment obligations
coming due started the payments crisis, and the IMF insisted on an exchange
rate change or floating the peso as a preconditon for debt restructuring. The
government floated the peso and received almost $200 million in credits from
private and official sources.69
That shift must of course be counted as the single most significant
payments response to devaluation because it encompassed not only the crea-
tion of new debt but the restructuring of payments on existing debt. Private
capital flows do not appear to have altered significantly. Baldwin reported,
however, that exports also responded:
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Those credits were used, primarily, to liberalize imports, and the flow of im-
ports into Turkey increased dramatically. Despite an increase in exports of
$116 million between 1958 and 1959 (part of which resulted from the reversal
of inventory speculation prior to the devaluation), the trade balance deficit in-
creased from $37 million to $70 million. Turkey had long since exhausted
available credit facilities, so reduction of the trade deficit was not the object of
the devaluation.72
After the 1970 devaluation, by contrast, some official credits were ex-
tended, but the biggest short-term change was in remittances from Turkish
workers in Europe. Workers' remittances had been $141 million in 1969,
and they rose to $273 million in 1970 (mostly in the last five months of the
year) and then to $471 million in 1971. In addition, export earnings increased
sharply, partly because of a good harvest but also as a consequence of ex-
change rate changes. Imports were liberalized, also, and they rose from $801
million in 1969 to $1,171 million in 1971; the result was a virtual elimination of
premiums on import licenses. The remarkable increase in current account
receipts following devaluation was large enough to finance the increased flow
of imports.
Empirical Regularities across Devaluations
The most striking characteristic of the country studies is the variety of initial
conditions and motives for initiating Phase III episodes. These circumstances
uniquely influenced the outcome of each devaluation. The philosophy
underlying the entire NBER project—that sound economic analysis can be per-
formed only in light of knowledge about the economic structure of the coun-
try—is once again confirmed by the evidence. It is apparent that the sorts of
standards one might use to judge the short-run outcome of devaluations must
differ substantially with circumstances. In many cases the relevant criterion is
probably the degree to which quantitative controls were removed from imports
or the fraction of commodities that were free to enter with automatic approval
or without any licensing. Closely related to that measure, of course, is the ex-
tent to which premiums on import licenses were absorbed due to the combina-
tion of policies adopted following devaluation. Judged by these criteria, most
devaluations had some short-run success; the devaluations in Colombia and
Egypt, both in 1962, come to mind as examples of two that did not. The degree
of initial success differed markedly, ranging all the way from Ghana and In-
dia, where premiums were partially absorbed and import flows were maintain-
ed, to cases where premiums virtually vanished—Israel in 1952, the Philippines
after 1960, and Turkey in 1958 and 1970.
When it comes to analyzing the behavior of various components of the
balance of payments, there is again a great deal of variance. In a few countries,176 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE Ill
including Israel, the Philippines, and Turkey in 1958, there was a sizable short-
term increase in current account receipts. In most other countries, authors
found some increase in exports (or at least a failure to decrease as much as they
otherwise would have), but in the short run the order of magnitude was not
sufficient to provide a dependable basis on which to liberalize imports. In
general the evidence is consistent with the notion of a lag in export response.
Other potential short-run sources of foreign exchange receipts appear to
have been the exception rather than the rule. There do not appear to have been
large counterspeculative flows. While some private capital outflows
reversed, other factors usually dominated the determination of private capital
flows, and devaluation by itself did not offset them.
Surprisingly enough, official flows seem to be the most uniformly respon-
sive to changes in the exchange rate. The reasons are largely those given by
Leith (see page 171), although the fact that debt often brings about devalua-
tion also contributes. Perhaps the most common single pattern observed
among the twenty-two Phase III episodes was that of accumulated in-
debtedness bringing about both the devaluation decision and foreign creditors'
involvement in it. The issues involved with debt accumulation and foreign
creditors, and their involvement in Phase III, must be postponed until Chapter
10, but because of these features, examination of balance-of-payments
statements cannot tell the full story of the response to devaluation; part of it is
reflected in asset, and not in flow, changes.
What is significant here is the frequency with which foreign indebtedness
was the overriding consideration in deciding to devalue. Perhaps equally im-
portant was the number of times the additional foreign credits that were ex-
tended as part of the devaluation package were employed to liberalize imports.
In many of those instances, import liberalization could not have begun
without new lines of credit. Of those liberalizations that were made possible
because of credits, many were terminated when the credits were exhausted. In
fact, IMF stabilization programs have come to connote an association with
this sequence of stabilization program, use of new credits to finance import
liberalization, exhaustion of credit, and return to QRs. It will be seen below
that those experiences are almost uniformly accompanied by failure to alter
the exchange rate by enough to expect any sustained response.
A final point to be noted is that nothing can be inferred based only on the
behavior or imports following Phase III; whether they increase or decrease,
and by how much, is largely a function of policy decisions. Since imports are
controlled by quantitative restrictions in Phase II, it is hardly surprising that
their behavior in Phase III is part of the policy package and not part of the
economy's response to it.
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JAppendix to Chapter 8
Statistical Investigation of the Impact
of Devaluation on the Price Level
by Anne 0. Krueger and Salih Neftci
Theresults of a statistical investigation of the, effect of devaluation on the
price level are reported in this appendix. More precisely, we test the hypothesis
that, on the average, devaluation leads to an increase in theprice level in
developing countries. This test is based on the assumption that the impact of
devaluation on the price level in these countries is roughly similar, even though
the structure of price determination is different. A simple regression model is
used to determine this average effect, after account is taken of the role of past
price changes and money supply behavior.
It is evident that the underlying structure of each country differs from
that of every other. No simple model can be a satisfactory structural represen-
tation because it cannot adequately provide estimates of enough of the various
influences on the price level. Nevertheless, generalizations will be made on the
basis of the experience of the project countries, and it seems worthwhile to at-
tempt some form of pooling of time-series and cross-section data; however,
the results, at best, yield something of a description of average behavior.
The time series in question are of the price level and the money supply in
each of the project countries. The cross-section consists of observations of
periods following devaluation in several countries. For example, observations
of the quarter following devaluation may be regarded as constituting a cross-
section from which the average, initial impact of devaluation (and whatever
other variables were systematically operating) on the price level could be infer-
red.
The basic model is very simple—obtaining comparable data and a com-
parable structure across ten countries does not appear likely to withstand the
challenge of a highly complex price-determination model. It is assumed that
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money supply, and lagged price level and that the coefficients of the function
differ for each country. Devaluation, however, is presumed to have the same
impact—if any—on price formation in each country once account is taken of
the effects of past price level and money supply behavior. Several variants of
this basic model were estimated. The basic structure of the system is linear, so
that for the jth country:
P,(t) =1%+ —1)+ +f331M(t—+ a,D, + €1(t)
where jisthe country subscript (with ten countries, j= 1,..., 10);MAt) =
themoney supply of the jth country at time t; PAt) denotes the price level of
the jth country at time t; D., i =1,..., 5are dummy variables common to
all countries; a,, i =1,..., 5are the coefficients of these dummy variables;
and are parameters to be estimatedis the same for all coun-
tries since it has no country-specific subscript); denotes a random distur-
bance affecting the price level of the jth country; it is assumed to have the
following properties:
E(€,[t])= Oforall), t
E(€J[t]ek[s])=ift= s,j = k
0,if t * s, orj * k
lxi 0 •
S S S
. . S S
• • D, D5
S S • .
10 X10.
where=thenumber of observations of thejth country, andisx 1),
is(N, x 3), €.isx 1). In addition, = ..., 10are (3 x 1) vec-
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Thus, ifis the observation vector on the jth country's price level, and X1 is
the matrix of observations on P1(t —1), M1(t— 1),we can write the
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and are included to measure the impact of devaluation on the price level. In
order to accomplish this, dummy variables are set to assume the following
values: D1 =Ifor the period during which devaluation takes place and zero
for all other observations; D2 =1for the first period after devaluation and
zero for all other observations; D3 =1for the second period after devalua-
tion, and so on. Two equations were estimated, one with dummy variables and
the other without them. The F test was then applied to test for the significance
of the dummies. Three alternative versions of the model were estimated in this
manner. In one version, the values of the variables were used; in the second,
first differences in the values of the variables were used; and in the third,
logarithms of the variables were used.
The model was estimated using both quarterly and annual data, and the
results of the two most satisfactory versions are summarized in Table 8-IA.
The version on the left-hand side of the table omits the current money supply
variable, and the version on the right includes it. To reduce the variables for
each country to the same mean (which is important when money supply is
given in different units), all price and money supply data were indexed on the
same base.
There are, of course, problems with the estimation procedure itself. Ideal-
ly, a considerably more complex lag structure should be used, and also the in-
fluence of other variables, such as import liberalization, should be taken into
account. It proved impossible, however, to attempt this within the confines of
the time and computer resources available. As the model stands, serial correla-
tion is not entirely eliminated, as indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistics
reported in the table.
Since the major purpose of the estimates is to test for the significance of
dummy variables, inspection of possible sources of bias in the estimates is of
considerable importance. The major possible source is omission of nominal in-
come as a separate independent variable, since justification for use of the
money supply must, in fact, rest on the quantity theory of money. Because in-
come and prices move together and because it is expected that there is positive
correlation—if any—between devaluation and income, it is likely that this
omission biases the coefficients of the dummies upward.
Turning to the regression estimates, the coefficients for each country for
each version are given in Table 8-lA. The lagged value of the price variable is
highly significant, as indicated by the relatively large t values for each country.
The "best" estimate is Version I, but it is marred by the presence of serial cor-
relation. The lagged money supply is significant in Version I for Chile, Colom-
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j INVESTIGATIONOF DEVALUATION IMPACT ON PRICE LEVEL
Table 8-1 A.Regression Estimates of the Price Level Impact of Devaluation




Country Period P(t —1) M(t —1)
VersionII: Coefficients of
P(t —1) M(t —1) M(t)
Brazil 1953-1972 0.98 0.001 0.98 0.08 —0.04
(25.4) (.9) (20.5) (.7) (—.4)
Chile 1954-1972 .88 .06 .88 .11 —.04
(32.5) (4.6) (31.7) (1.6) (—.7)
Colombia 1951-1972 .49 .35 .49 .35 .00
(3.5) (2.7) (3.5) (.5) (.00)
Egypt 1955-1972 .68 .15 .68 .12 .03
(4.3) (.9) (4.3) (.2) (.1)
Ghana 1957-1972 .67 .21 .62 .12 .15
(4.1) (1.1) (3.4) (.5) (.71)
India 1954-1972 .50 .36 .50 .63 —.26
(2.6) (1.9) (2.6) (.8) (—.4)
Israel 195 1-1972 .64 .16 .64 —.04 .19
(7.0) (2.0) (6.8) (—.1) (.3)
South Korea1954-1972 .82 .04 .81 .01 .03
(16.2) (1.9) (16.0) (.1) (.2)
Philippines 1954-1972 .49 .33 .49 .24 .08
(3.3) (2.4) (3.3) (.6) (.2)
Turkey 1957-1972 .58 .20 .58 .16 .03
(4.8) (2.4) (4.8) (.7) (.2)
Constant. 20.7 (11.0) 20.6 (10.8)
Coefficients of Dupnmies:
Quarter of devaluation —3.6 (—.8) —3.9 (—.8)
One quarter after —2.8 (—.6) —3.2 (—.7)
Two quarters after —2.7 (—.5) —2.7 (—.6)
Three quarters after —2.1 (—.4) —2.1 (—.4)
Four quarters after —2.9 (—.6) —2.8 (—.6)
F-test: all dummies insignificant: 0.33 0.35
F-test: all coefficients are zero:1280.0 903.8
R2 .98 .98
Durbin-Watson Statistic: 1.56 1.57
Numbers in parentheses are f-statistics.
Sources: All data are from IMF, International Financial Statistics, supplements for 1967/68,
1973. Price data are wholesale prices from line 63, except for Chile, where line A63 was used,
and Turkey, where line 63a was used. Money supply data are from [me 34.184 SHORT-RUN RESPONSE TO PHASE III
the current money supply variable in Version 2 seems to lead to some negative
coefficients. However, what is important is that the sign of the "sum" of both
money supply coefficients is positive, not that they individually are less than
zero.
The results of both versions are roughly similar. The coefficients on the
lagged price level and lagged money supply do not seem to be seriously af-
fected by introduction of the current money supply variable. Note, however,
that because of multicollinearity, introduction of M(t) lowers all t for the lag-
ged money supply coefficients; almost all were significant in Version I.
The bottom of Table 8-lA gives the coefficients of the dummy variables
and their t statistics for each of the five quarters. None of the dummies, except
for the third quarter after devaluation taken alone in Version II, is significant;
indeed, all signs are negative, implying that price increases are, if anything,
smaller than expected after devaluations. Using the F-test to test the
hypothesis that all dummy variables are zero confirms the hypothesis at the 1
percent level. The results of all other regression estimates gave the same results
with respect to the quarterly dummies; in logarithmic form and in first dif-
ference form, the hypothesis that the dummies were not significant was ac-
cepted at the 5 percent level.
Tests on annual data generally provided poorer fits (with negative sign on
the money supply in many cases) than those on quarterly data. But again the
dummies had negative coefficients and were insignificant.
These results confirm the impression gleaned from the individual country
studies. Whatever inflationary impact devaluation might have had was insuffi-
ciently strong to offset other influences on the price level, even after account is
taken (crudely) of the effects of the money supply; on average, the rate of in-
flation was not any higher in the period following devaluation than before.
Chapter 9
to Phase
Sofar it has been
in a certain amour
both the bias and
liberalization is no
occurs because pr
may result from th
mit import flows ti
The initial
r







on how foreign ex
in the short run
tivity, their contin






ings and other sou